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THE MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY TRADITION
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INTRODUCTION
Mexico's foreign policy is quite unique. More than any other
large country, the Mexican tradition has been to renounce the un-
stated assumptions of "power politics." In its place, twentieth cen-
tury Mexican decision makers have substituted a defensive foreign
policy distilled from their ideology, prudent self-interest and their
national experience. In the late 1980s, this has begun to slowly
change. Oil, financial crises, tension at Mexico's northern and
southern borders, and domestic unrest have altered Mexico's inter-
action with the world. It is unclear whether this has altered Mex-
ico's perception of its own interests.
Mexico's position and participation in international politics thus
defies easy categorization. The issue is not whether it has the means
to enter the ranks of powerful nations. Mexico is already a signifi-
cant nation whose sense of nationalism confirms that. The question
is how Mexico will face its overwhelming problems. Positioned to
take off industrially with its resources, energy, and growing tech-
nology Mexico is an upwardly mobile nation. The global petroleum
economy has brought a new challenge to Mexico, that is now forc-
ing major choices on Mexican policy. Even with the potential for
being a modern state, Mexico does not appear to have the national
self-confidence and attendant interests for even regional power aspi-
rations. In strategic terms, Mexico has the foundation to become a
powerful nation, but appears reluctant to accept the responsibility.
The apparent absence of serious ambitions is indicated by an
adaptive and flexible foreign policy. Mexico has adapted itself to
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being in the strategic shadow of the United States. This strategic
factor has in turn enhanced flexibility. The nation's unique political
system and the myth of a revolutionary government has given Mex-
ico flexibility in the Third World community, albeit uncertain flexi-
bility. Since Mexico has not viewed itself as a "power" player, it
has not played a particularly meaningful global or even regional
role.
The lack of structure in Mexican foreign policy thus makes its
assessment important but difficult. Mexico is a potentially powerful,
fast-developing, increasingly sophisticated nation. It is likely to gen-
erate challenges for its neighbors, and thus, is a nation to be reck-
oned with. Its present economic crisis notwithstanding, Mexico has
the capability to join the ranks of the key newly industrialized
countries by the end of the. century. Its status as an "emerging
power," and its unique proximity to the United States highlight the
subtleties involved in assessing Mexico's foreign and defense policy.
I. MEXICO'S WORLD VIEW
Since the early 1980s the fragility of Mexico's vast natural
wealth has become increasingly apparent. Many areas and particu-
larly southern Mexico, suffer from the same type of socio-economic
problems that have spawned guerilla movements in Central
America. Yet, Mexican rhetoric is often encouraging and tacitly
sympathetic to neighboring revolutionary movements. The public
doesn't seem to be aware of the potential for similar activity devel-
oping within Mexico.
Areas of northern Mexico have rejected the "Revolution" prac-
tices by demonstrating rage at the ballot box and near-chaos in pro-
vincial streets. Mexican foreign policy has ambivalently embraced
the principles of Western democracy, creating a challenging para-
dox for the nation's leadership.
Mexico's ability to preserve domestic peace and protect its own
interests will be issues if regional crises spread within its borders.
Some argue that there is an implicit understanding or expectation,
in both Mexico and the United States that a U.S. security blanket
covers Mexico. It is argued that the United States would be the
ultimate guarantor of Mexico's security in the event of a major
threat to Mexico. However, Mexico should be the ultimate guaran-
tor of its own security.
There is scattered evidence of a more sober and realistic tone in
recent Mexican foreign policy. The nation's acute economic chal-
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lenge, political unrest, and proximity to Central American instabil-
ity have cooled the idealistic notions of Mexican rhetoric. In addi-
tion, it appears that national security issues have received increased
attention by the Mexican leadership in recent years.
The Mexican view of international relations cannot be compared
to Brazil's practical "realpolitik" or Argentina's active, if not mis-
taken, vision of itself in the world. There has not been any strenu-
ous activism trying to change Mexico's physical or material condi-
tion. This has caused policy generally to be devoid of specific
references to practical instrumentalities, but strong on procedural
details. The Mexican Foreign Ministry is concerned with ideologi-
cal matters and public relations, saying that these areas represent
the national interest. Defense matters are within the purview of the
Interior Ministry (internal security) and the National Defense
Ministry (operational matters). Overall policy originates from the
Presidential office. The Mexican President holds extensive executive
authority. However, in the absence of a conventional military strat-
egy, and with the secondary role played by the Mexican military
establishment in the current political structure, Mexico's world
view is defined in diplomatic rather than defense terms.
Mexico's foreign policy lacks a hard edge due to a reluctance to
conceptualize the nation's role in politically active terms. Mexico is
generally cautious and low-profile; it may even appear to be pas-
sive. In contrast to Brazil and Argentina, there appears to be only a
limited cognizance of the nation's growing margin of international
action. Thus, Mexican foreign policy achievements are unlikely to
be felt by the international community.
II. FOREIGN RELATIONS RESOURCES
The Mexican President has unchallenged primacy in the realm of
foreign relations. He is the principal initiator and final arbiter of
the government's foreign policy: His influence in the domestic sec-
tor gives him the ability to affect most aspects of the nation's rela-
tions with the outside world. This independence provides "revolu-
tionary legitimacy" at the international level, blunts domestic
criticism, and strengthens Mexican symbolism. In practice, the
President's powers are very extensive. The President makes impor-
tant foreign policy decisions assisted by a small coterie of personal
advisors. He also commands the armed forces, appoints the nation's
diplomatic representation abroad, approves treaties, and attends or
hosts international conferences.
19871
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The opinions of the top bureaucrats and leading Partido Revolu-
cionario Institucional (PRI) figures are considered. However, Con-
gress, the press, and non-government intellectuals have little direct
impact. The Mexican President enjoys wide latitude within the
broad limits set by ideology, entrenched political interests, and pub-
lic opinion.
Presidential directives on foreign policy questions as well as day-
to-day contact are handled by an expanding network of government
agencies. This network reflects Mexico's reserved diplomacy, low
visibility, internal security interests, and the high priority given its
economic and development policy. Foreign affairs neither support a
large bureaucracy nor absorb a significant portion of the national
budget.
Security policies are defined by a closed elite. However, there are
no empirical statements clearly suggesting how Mexican leaders
should define foreign and security policies. First, Mexican security
has been influenced by a "power politics" strategy inapplicable to
regional realities. This strategy has been used because of the unique
difference between national power on the northern and southern
borders. Fear of American expansionism has receded, but remains
present in the Mexican psyche. Mexico's attitude toward Central
America has not been considered in relation to security or national
ambition until recently.
Second, contemporary Mexican policy continues to be balanced
between independence from the United States and cooperation with
the United States in global and regional affairs. The United States
is Mexico's primary security guarantor, but represents its most sali-
ent psychological threat. The policy asymmetry was based on the
unchallenged regional power of the United States. The fundamen-
tal integrity of Mexico was not an issue. These assumptions are no
longer entirely applicable.
Third, since 1950, Mexico's preoccupation has been promoting
economic growth, in response to the perception of the foreign eco-
nomic threat. Additional priorities have been the need to maintain
socioeconomic and political equilibrium. Mexico feels the most vul-
nerable in regard to its economic wealth, its industrial and its tech-
nological infrastructure.
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III. MEXICO'S SECURITY CULTURE
Mexico has no major foreign rivals. In this century, this has re-
sulted in Mexico's cultivation of the legal and moral norms of
Western culture. Those norms promote opposition to the use of
force to settle disputes and the interference by one nation in the
internal affairs of another. Critics have suggested that this has led
Mexico to overlook potential external security threats. But the na-
tion's leadership believes its security has been preserved by the con-
tinuous affirmation of the juridical approach to international rela-
tions. According to the Mexican world view, the legal and moral
equality of states is the foundation of a viable global system. There-
fore they have applied the principles of non-intervention and self-
determination. The Estrada doctrine of 1929, implied that nations
well capable of making judgments regarding the legitimacy of re-
gimes in other countries.
Mexico's disinclination to be actively engaged in international af-
fairs has been particularly noticeable in security matters. Thus,
Mexico has not allied itself with any other nations or bloc. One
attempt to do so was apparent in Luis Echeverria's presidency
(1970-1976) when he proposed a Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States to the United Nations. This was a nebulous mech-
anism for defining relationships between developed and developing
states in the areas of trade, investment, and assistance policies an
attempt that led nowhere. There were similar hopes at the 1981
North-South conference at Cancfin. There President Lopez Portillo
(1976-1982) hosted an international gathering, with an agenda full
of symbolism but devoid of substance.
Because Mexico's approach to its security strategy is the product
of its ideology, self-interest, and national interest, trends in the na-
tion's security behavior have been changing very slowly. But Mex-
ico now faces a change in the security equation, domestically and in
Central America, that is rendering original calculations obsolete.
The basic national interest continues to include protecting the
achievements of the Mexican revolution, and promoting Mexico's
economic development and commercial needs. However, these foun-
dations have been increasingly eroded by domestic crises, regional
vulnerabilities, internal security problems and the discontinuities
between Mexico's rhetoric and its strategic realities.
1987]
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CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MEXICAN FOREIGN
POLICY
Brian Latell*
INTRODUCTION
Mexican Foreign Secretary Bernardo Sepulveda wrote in 1984
that his country's foreign policy is distinguished by its continuity,
uniformity, and predictability.' Unlike other countries in which ex-
ternal priorities and policy directions often change when new ad-
ministrations are inaugurated, or surprising departures are an-
nounced by those already in office, he argued that Mexico has
followed a "consistent course" for more than sixty years. Sepulveda
emphasized that through administrations of presidents since the
1920s, and the often sweeping changes in domestic policies that
they have directed, Mexico's foreign policy has remained remarka-
bly constant. The principal reason for that, according to the foreign
secretary and to the president he has served, is that Mexican inter-
national interests are based on a set of enduring principles-self-
determination, non-intervention, the juridical equality of states, and
the peaceful settlement of disputes-that inspire a unique foreign
policy and national security doctrine.
President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88), writing on Mexican
foreign policy in 1984, stated that those principles "are a product
of our own historical experience-one that led us to place a high
value on ... the force of reason, political negotiation and compli-
ance with international law."2 The experience to which he refers
includes the traumatic and truncating war with the United States
that resulted in the loss of about one-half of Mexico's territory in
the mid-nineteenth century, and in widespread and seemingly in-
tractable fears of U.S. domination in the twentieth century. Thus,
it is because of Mexico's geography, history, and psychology that
its nationalism is overwhelmingly defined in terms of its relation-
ship with the United States. Also, observers have argued persua-
* Senior Specialist on Latin America, National Intelligence Council, and Adjunct Pro-
fessor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
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2. De la Madrid, Mexico: The New Challenges, 63 FOREIGN AFF., 68 (1984).
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sively, that it is because of Mexico's singularity of outlook, that its
foreign policy has changed very little since the administration of
Venustiano Carranza (1917-20). Sepulveda argues that it is not a
policy of abstractions, but one based on Mexico's "most legitimate
national interests."3
Although these and similar arguments by Mexican leaders and
scholars accurately describe a high degree of continuity in their
country's foreign policy, they tend to obscure the many substantial
changes that have also occurred since the early 1970s. Within
about fifteen months of his inauguration in December 1970, the
populist and ultra-nationalist president Luis Echeverria launched
an unprecedented international campaign aimed at expanding Mex-
ico's prestige and influence, and transcending its traditional depen-
dence on, and preoccupation with, the United States. During the
remainder of his six-year term Echeverria was more preoccupied
with foreign policy issues than any Mexican president before or
since. He traveled to thirty-five countries and the Vatican, met with
sixty-four heads of government, and exchanged diplomats with
sixty-seven additional countries.4 Echeverria probably visited more
countries during his term in office than all other Mexican chief ex-
ecutives combined.
The new Mexican internationalism that Echeverria launched de-
parted in significant respects from the established foreign policy
that he inherited. It was, according to a leading Mexican scholar,
"a more activist and universalist" approach, and one more "con-
cerned with Third World causes. "5 Echeverria visited twenty-two
countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, and
indefatigably campaigned for the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States that his administration drafted. His efforts in be-
half of Third World causes resulted in a steady escalation of ten-
sions with the United States, in large part because of his often out-
spoken advocacy of revolutionary and radical causes and
governments. Mexico's relations with the Soviet Union began to
improve dramatically during Echeverria's administration, and his
extended visit there in April 1973 was the first by a Mexican presi-
dent and only the third by a Latin American chief of state. In addi-
tion, he was the first Mexican president persistently to assert Mex-
ico's aspirations to perform as a regional power in Latin America
3. Amor, supra note I, at 409.
4. Grayson, Mexican Foreign Policy, 72 CURRENT HISTORY, 98 (March 1977).
5. M. OJEDA, MEXICO: EL SURGIMIENTO DE UNA POLITICA EXTERIOR ACTIVA (1986).
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and the Caribbean Basin.
Echeverria's new interests have continued to be important priori-
ties for subsequent Mexican administrations. Echeverria's succes-
sor, Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-82), was even more energetic in
seeking to advance Mexico's influence in the Caribbean Basin while
also presiding over a considerable broadening of relations with the
U.S.S.R., Cuba, and other communist countries. He placed high
priority on improving relations with Third World nations, and on
supporting revolutionary movements and governments. This focus
generated serious tensions with the United States. Although his
successor, Miguel de la Madrid, has been less concerned with for-
eign policy issues because of the grave internal problems that he
inherited when he took office in December 1982, he too, has contin-
ued to assert a more activist international posture. This has oc-
curred, especially through the leadership role that Mexico has
played in the Contadora and Delhi Six groups of countries. Since
1972, Mexican presidents and their foreign secretaries have devel-
oped an ambitious and energetic foreign policy that has been truly
global in its reach. It differs from Mexico's traditional foreign pol-
icy in the following four main respects.
I. ADVOCACY OF NON-ALIGNED AND THIRD WORLD CAUSES
Echeverria's first trip abroad was made, in March 1972, to Ja-
pan, however, one month later, during a visit to Peru and Chile his
abiding interest in foreign affairs was first elaborated. He appeared
on April 19, before the third session of the United Nations Com-
mittee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in Santiago, to
present his Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. For the re-
mainder of his term the goals expressed in that document served as
the bulwark of his ambitious foreign policy. During the visit to
Chile he solidified close relations with the socialist regime of Salva-
dor Allende, which was by then in sharp conflict with the Nixon
administration. Echeverria intended to demonstrate Mexico's inde-
pendence from the United States and to express support for Al-
lende's nationalistic and radical program, but he also used the visit
to assuage radical and leftist forces in Mexico whose opposition to
his administration had been intense.6
Echeverria's Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was
6. See, e.g., Shapira, Mexico's Foreign Policy Under Echeverria, 31 INTER-AMERICAN
ECON. AFF., 38 (1978).
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designed to correct what he considered the egregious inequities be-
tween rich nations and Third World countries. In his State of the
Nation address, in September 1976, he attacked "the structure of
the unjust system of world exploitation based on a colonial view of
work, on the stealing of natural resources and devaluation of raw
materials and human effort of Third World countries." By aggres-
sively advocating the Charter, Mexico for the first time became a
progressive leader among those countries demanding a radical re-
alignment of international wealth and power and an outspoken ad-
vocate of improved North-South dialogue. By the time the Charter
was adopted by the United Nations in December 1974, Mexico's
legitimacy as a leading Third World nation seemed assured.
The pursuit of that goal has caused recurring and serious ten-
sions in Mexico's relations with the United States. Although con-
siderable stress was generated by the support that Echeverria and
Lopez Portillo provided to revolutionary governments and groups in
Latin America, some of their sharpest confrontations with the
United States were the result of Mexican initiatives involving the
Middle East. Echeverria, in particular, courted the Arab world. He
visited five Arab nations and then on August 4, 1975, announced
his proposed Third World economic system in Alexandria, Egypt.
Later, he permitted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
to open its first Latin American office in Mexico City. It was Mex-
ico's anti-Zionist vote at the United Nations on November 10,
1975, however, that resulted in the greatest damage to U.S.-Mexi-
can relations during those years.
Although that vote was generally consistent with Echeverria's
larger Third World policy, it dramatized his abandonment of the
traditional principles of non-intervention and self-determination,
and marked a sharp departure from Mexico's policy of non-involve-
ment and neutrality in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.7 That
controversial vote proved highly counterproductive and embarrass-
ing. Jewish organizations in the United States organized a boycott
of Mexico, and the resulting decline in tourist revenues and foreign
investment flows added strong new downward pressures to an al-
ready troubled economy. Ultimately, Echeverria was forced to re-
treat, and in December 1975 he sent Foreign Secretary Emilio
Rabasa to Jerusalem where, in effect, he apologized. Thus, by dem-
onstrating how Mexico's economic vulnerability imposed serious
7. Id. at 55.
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limits on its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy, the
anti-Zionist vote was highly embarrassing to Echeverria.8
Another grave misunderstanding, this one between the Lopez
Portillo and Carter administrations, involving another Middle East-
ern country, marked the nadir of relations between those two lead-
ers, late in 1979. When it became clear in October that the Shah of
Iran, then in exile in Mexico, needed medical treatment for cancer,
the Carter adminstration reversed its earlier reluctance to allow
him into the United States. Quoting Acting Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher, Carter noted in his memoirs that "Mexican
President Lopez Portillo informed the Shah on October 19, that he
could return to Mexico following the medical treatment here."9 The
U.S. embassy in Teheran was occupied by Iranian radicals on No-
vember 4th, and soon, according to Carter, the Shah "recognized
the problems he had caused us in coming here, and thought he
would be able to leave . . . in a few days."1 On November 29,
however, Carter made the following entry in his diary: "About 6:30
(Secretary of State Cyrus Vance) called with the unbelievable news
that the Mexicans had reversed themselves during the day and now
would not be willing to accept the Shah in their country. Lopez
Portillo is not a man of his word ... ."' Carter's uncharacteristic
condemnation of the Mexican president was one of the harshest
criticisms he levied on record, against any world leader.
From Carter's perspective, Mexico's refusal to readmit the Shah
was inexplicable. "The Mexicans had no diplomatic personnel in
Iran, had moved all their people out of the country, and did not
need Iranian oil," he noted in his diary on November 29. Carter
and other United States officials apparently failed to understand
that Lopez Portillo had performed in a manner entirely consistent
with two converging priorities of Mexican foreign policy. Despite
whatever elements of personal unpredictability and animosity that
may have been involved in his decision, Lopez Portillo wished,
above all, to demonstrate Mexico's independence from the United
States and to avoid the appearance of taking sides with Washington
8. Shapira emphasizes that the tourism boycott by U.S. Jewish organizations was in-
terpreted in the Mexican press as a major humiliation. He points out that Excelsior, articu-
lating a generally-held feeling, insisted that the guidelines of Mexico's foreign policy should
be "neither improvised nor respondent to pressures, but neither should they be impolitic nor
injurious to the values of Mexican diplomatic tradition." Id. at 56.
9. J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 456 (1982).
10. Id. at 468.
II. Id.
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against a revolutionary Third World regime. As a result, U.S.-
Mexican relations fell to one of their lowest levels in decades.
Since de la Madrid took office in December 1982, Mexico has
largely suspended its efforts to play a leadership role among Third
World countries, and on North-South issues. The current Mexican
president's limited foreign travel has been largely aimed at ex-
panding markets for Mexican goods, and attracting capital and
technology. His speeches, writings, and interviews suggest that he
has virtually no personal interest in Third World causes and issues.
Even in the face of the approximately $100 billion debt that had
accumulated by 1987, he was unwilling to join with other debtor
states in seeking to gain greater leverage over Mexico's creditors
through the use of multilateral pressures. Thus, his assertion that
"the principles of self-determination and nonintervention in the af-
fairs of other countries are of deep significance to Mexico" 12 sug-
gests that his interpretation of those doctrines is more in keeping
with the traditional view than were those of his two, more activist
predecessors.
II. REGIONAL POWER ASPIRATIONS
Although a few previous presidents, especially Adolfo Lopez
Mateos (1958-64), exhibited special interest in expanding relations
with other Latin American countries, it was Echeverria who first
strongly asserted Mexico's desire to play a leadership role in Latin
America and the Caribbean. He traveled to twelve countries in the
region, and was the first Mexican chief executive to visit Castro's
Cuba. As a result of his persistent lobbying in the hemisphere for
his Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, and for greater cooper-
ation among the developing nations, Echeverria became the most
visible, and, after Allende's ouster by the Chilean military in Sep-
tember 1973, the most outspoken Latin American advocate of
Third World causes.' 3
During a seven-nation regional tour in July 1974 Echeverria ac-
celerated efforts to forge greater Latin American solidarity in rela-
tions with the United States. During his third stop, in Lima on July
15, he first spoke publicly of his plan to create a Latin American
Economic System (SELA) that would exclude the United States. A
12. De la Madrid, supra note 2, at 68.
13. Poitras, Mexico's "New" Foreign Policy, 28 INTER-AMERICAN ECON. AFF., 71(1974). This is especially true since Allende's ouster by the Chilean military in September
1973.
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few days later, in Buenos Aires, he and the aged populist President
Juan Peron signed a joint communique attacking the great powers
and asserting their countries' independence in foreign affairs." In a
combative speech at the Argentine presidential residence, Echever-
ria denounced great power control over the destinies of dependent
nations and called on the Latin America countries to integrate eco-
nomically. A week later, in Venezuela, he won the enthusiastic
backing of President Carlos Andres Perez for his SELA proposal.
The two proceeded to persuade their Latin American neighbors
that "the countries of the Third World, and those of Latin America
in particular, must unite in defense of their common principles and
interests or resign themselves to remaining underdeveloped indefi-
nitely."'15 Their efforts resulted in the approval of SELA by twenty-
five countries of the region on October 17, 1975. The continued
collaboration of Echeverria and Perez, and their parallel interests
in asserting greater influence in the Caribbean Basin, also resulted,
in 1975, in the creation of the Caribbean Multinational Shipping
Company (NAMUCAR), which like SELA, included Cuba but not
the United States. Echeverria and Perez also promoted the reacti-
vation of the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).'
Echeverria's attempts to play a regional leadership role were given
even greater impetus by his successor. In fact, Mexico's importance
as a regional power willing to confront the United States, and to
act as an ally of Marxist and revolutionary forces in Central
America and the Caribbean, reached its zenith during the last few
years of Lopez Portillo's term. His government helped the
Sandinista National Liberation Front to win power in Nicaragua.
In May 1979 Mexico severed diplomatic relations with the Somoza
dictatorship and called on other Latin American countries to do the
same. The resulting damage to Somoza's legitimacy was profound,
and the Sandinista National Directorate promptly issued a state-
ment expressing "revolutionary joy" for the Mexican action." Dur-
ing its first few years in power, moreover, the Sandinista govern-
ment was the recipient of substantial Mexican economic support,
through the deliveries of petroleum on credit, at reduced prices. Lo-
pez Portillo publicly emphasized his strong attachment to the
Sandinista revolution during a visit by Nicaraguan leader Daniel
14. Id.
15. Grayson, supra note 4, at 99.
16. Bryan, Mexico and the Caribbean, 10 CARIBBEAN REV. 6 (1981).
17. S. CHRISTIAN, NICARAGUA, REVOLUTION IN THE FAMILY 111 (1985).
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Ortega to Mexico City in May 1981 when he exclaimed that
"Mexico will defend the Nicaraguan cause as if it were its very
own.",
8
Lopez Portillo's policy toward El Salvador also directly and
powerfully confronted U.S. interests. In 1980 his government with-
drew its ambassador and downgraded its embassy in San Salvador
to a consulate while becoming increasingly critical of the military
and other conservative elements there. Mexico invited the Salvado-
ran Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) to join a Mexican
sponsored coalition of progressive Latin American political parties.
Most importantly, Mexico joined with the Mitterrand Government
in France in August 1981 in recognizing the coalition of the FDR
and the Marxist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN) as a "representative political force." Although, no other
governments emulated that initiative, the international legitimacy
and backing of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement was greatly
enhanced in the aftermath of the Franco-Mexican declaration.
Mexican relations with Cuba flourished during Lopez Portillo's
term, even as U.S.-Cuban relations steadily deteriorated. Between
May 1979 and August 1981 Lopez Portillo and Fidel Castro held
annual summits during which they coordinated their countries' pol-
icies toward Central America. In May 1982 the two spoke for the
first time on a presidential "hot line" linking them by satellite. 9 A
number of new bilateral accords were signed; binational commis-
sions met frequently; and cultural, scientific, and other contacts in-
creased dramatically. Trade, which in earlier years had remained
at negligible levels, grew rapidly beginning in 1979 mainly as a re-
sult of sizeable Mexican purchases of Cuban sugar. By 1981 Mex-
ico purchased $190 million of Cuban products while earning only
$25 million on sales to Havana. 0 In fact, no other Mexican leader
before or since has collaborated so intimately with Fidel Castro.
Thus, when de la Madrid took office, he inherited a regional for-
eign policy that had put Mexico at the forefront of developing
countries confronting the United States. However, unlike his two
immediate predecessors, he has been almost entirely absorbed with
Mexico's grave economic and financial problems, and has placed a
higher priority on maintaining cordial relations with the United
States. As a result, his administration has withdrawn from many of
18. Granma Weekly Review, May 17, 1981.
19. Latin America Daily Report, May 3, 1982, at V 1.
20. Id., April 29, 1982, at M 2.
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the confrontational policies pursued in earlier years, and Mexican
relations with Nicaragua, Cuba, and regional revolutionary groups
have noticeably cooled. Unlike Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, de la
Madrid has not visited Havana, or met with Castro, since he took
office. The warm rhetorical and diplomatic support that Mexico
had been providing Havana has markedly decreased. The large
trade deficits with Cuba that Lopez Portillo was willing to subsidize
for political and foreign policy purposes, have been transformed
into surpluses since de la Madrid took office. Mexico has played the
leading role in the Contadora group of countries seeking a negoti-
ated settlement of conflicts in Central America, but bilateral rela-
tions with the Sandinistas have cooled. Thus, under de la Madrid's
leadership, Mexico has withdrawn at least temporarily from its as-
sertive role as a regional power in the Caribbean Basin.
III. EXPANSION OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
The third major change in Mexican foreign policy that has oc-
curred since the early 1970s has been the broadening and intensifi-
cation of relations with Moscow.2" In 1924 Mexico was the first
country in the Western Hemisphere to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet regime, and since then, has often been at the
forefront of the Latin American countries broadening ties with
Moscow. However, it was not until Echeverria went to Moscow in
April 1973 that both Mexico and the U.S.S.R. began to assign a
high priority to their relations. Moreover, Echeverria took the initi-
ative with an initially somewhat reluctant Brezhnev regime, as a
steady and significant expansion in state-to-state relations occurred
during the remainder of his term. Numerous bilateral accords were
approved, including the first agreement, in August 1975, between a
non-communist Latin American country and the Soviet-controlled
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). Two new joint
commissions were constituted-the first having been established
during Echeverria's visit to Moscow-and cultural, commercial,
scientific, and other contacts considerably expanded.
Relations continued to broaden and deepen under Lopez Portillo.
He also visited the U.S.S.R. in May 1978 spending over a week
there with a large official entourage including four key cabinet sec-
retaries. A Soviet-Mexican consular convention and a program for
21. For a detailed discussion of Mexican-Soviet relations see B. LATELL, THE U.S.S.R.
AND MEXICO, THE SOVIET UNION AND LATIN AMERICA (E. Mujal-Leon, ed., forthcoming).
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scientific and technical cooperation were signed, and a warm,
lengthy communique was issued noting "the identity of their
stances on many key problems." 2 Lopez Portillo's main accom-
plishment was in winning Soviet accession to the Mexican-initiated
Tlatelolco Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America. The
joint communique emphasized that the two governments agreed on
the need for a "complete and universal ban on nuclear weapons
tests," and the termination of the "production of such weapons. '23
It seems in retrospect that Soviet support for the treaty was an im-
portant watershed in bilateral relations. It marked the beginning of
a gradually widening Mexican-Soviet cooperation in support of in-
ternational peace and disarmament.
During the mid and late 1970s, more agreements were negotiated
between the U.S.S.R. and Mexico than during the preceding fifty
years.24 Leaders in both countries placed a high priority on develop-
ing close personal ties, and the level and frequency of official visits
increased markedly. Most of these trends have continued under the
leadership of President de la Madrid. Although beleaguered by his
country's acute internal problems, and less committed than his two
predecessors to an expansive foreign policy, he has nonetheless con-
tributed to the development of closer relations with Moscow. Like
Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, de la Madrid recognizes that Mex-
ico's credibility as an independent, major world actor requires close
and expanding ties with the Soviet Union. He also realizes that
those ties provide important domestic political dividends in as-
suaging and coopting left wing and communist pressures.
The warming trend in Mexican-Soviet relations has probably in-
tensified since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985.
His foreign minister, Eduard Schevardnadze, visited Mexico in Oc-
tober 1986, his first to a Latin American country. Apparently, the
general secretary also plans to visit Mexico and thus become the
first top Soviet leader to visit a Latin American country other than
Cuba. Gorbachev signalled the high priority assigned to Mexico
when he received visiting Foreign Secretary Sepulveda in the
Kremlin, in May 1987, after passing up earlier opportunities to
meet with the Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan foreign minis-
ters during their visits to Moscow. Judging from Soviet media cov-
22. USSR Daily Report, May 17, 1978, at N 2.
23. Pravda, May 26, 1978, USSR Daily Report, May 30, 1978, at N 2.
24. Bushuyev & Y. Kozlov, untitled article, Kommunist, August 1978, no. 12. JPRS
72097, October 23, 1978, at 134.
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erage of the Sepulveda visit, the two leaders engaged in wide-rang-
ing and lengthy discussions. Among other things, Gorbachev
declared that "we treasure" the development of bilateral relations
and "want them to improve further."' He was also quoted by the
Soviet news agency, Tass as praising "the independence and vigor
of Mexico's foreign policy." 26
IV. BROKER ON EAST-WEST ISSUES
The fourth new dimension of Mexico's activist foreign policy is
the role it increasingly seeks to play as an arbitrator of important
issues relating to international peace and disarmament. Since the
1960s, Mexican statesmen and leaders have used multilateral diplo-
macy in efforts to reduce great power tensions, and enhance the
prospects for world peace and order. Their efforts have been in-
spired by principles that have long been at the core of Mexico's
foreign policy doctrine. In a certain sense, even Echeverria's often
bombastic campaign for the Charter of Economic Rights and Du-
ties was consistent with that tradition, as were Lopez Portillo's va-
inglorious efforts to mediate between the United States, revolution-
ary groups, and governments in Latin America. The emphasis de la
Madrid has placed on Contadora and the Delhi Six processes pro-
vides a contemporary example more genuinely consistent with Mex-
ico's foreign policy traditions. It was Alfonso Garcia Robles, how-
ever, a prominent Mexican lawyer and diplomat, principal author
of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in
1982, who has perhaps most selflessly embodied that tradition.
Among the last three Mexican presidents, all of whom, in vary-
ing degrees, have aspired to play the role of arbiter on East-West
issues, de la Madrid clearly has assigned that goal the highest pri-
ority. In fact, he has seemingly placed it at the center of his foreign
policy, his administration having withdrawn from the activist role
Mexico played on North-South issues and the role as a regional
power in the Caribbean Basin. The hallmarks of that new policy
are Contadora and the Delhi Six processes, both of which were ini-
tiated since de la Madrid took office.
The Contadora process began in January 1983 when de la Ma-
drid and the presidents of Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama met
in search of a diplomatic alternative to the escalating conflicts in
25. USSR Daily Report, May 7, 1987, at K 6.
26. Id. at K 7.
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Central America.17 Mexican leadership in Contadora has been
strengthened as new administrations have entered office in each of
the other member countries since 1983 and as a result of the de la
Madrid government's hosting of a series of bilateral negotiations
between the United States and Nicaragua, at the Mexican port of
Manzanillo, in 1984. The Contadora process has failed to produce
a viable peace plan acceptable to all of the major parties to the
disputes in Central America, and Mexico's impartiality has been
questioned by many observers in the United States. However, Mex-
ico's legitimacy as an international broker has been widely
enhanced.
The second major initiative of this sort associated with de la Ma-
drid began in January 1985 in New Delhi. The Mexican president
conferred there with the leaders of India, Greece, Sweden, Argen-
tina, and Tanzania and together they called for a halt to the testing
of nuclear weapons and a ban on the development of space weap-
ons. In August 1986 Mexico hosted a second meeting of the leaders
of the six nations at the Pacific resort of Ixtapa. They urged the
United States and the U.S.S.R. to cease nuclear testing under a
verification plan that they devised, and in a criticism widely aimed
primarily at the Reagan administration, called for an end to the
development of space weapons.
CONCLUSION
Although the record of Mexico's increasing internationalism
since the early 1970s in part supports the view that its foreign pol-
icy is consistent and predictable, there has clearly been substantial
evolution and discontinuity as well. The relationship with the
United States has become considerably more complex and volatile
since Echeverria launched his global activism. Widespread consen-
sus has developed among Mexican elites in favor of greater inde-
pendence from the United States and these, and related trends af-
fecting the bilateral relationship, seem likely to grow stronger.
Perhaps the most important trend recently discussed by
Humberto Garza Elizondo, a leading Mexican expert, has been the
steadily diminishing willingness of Mexico to "collaborate with the
United States on problems relating to the East-West conflict." 8
27. Purcell, Demystifying Contadora, 64 FOREIGN AFF., 75-76 (1985).
28. H. GARZA ELIZONDO, MEXICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, SOVIET-LATIN AMERICAN
RELATIONS IN THE 1980s 206 (A. Varas ed. 1987).
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Garza Elizondo noted that "contrary to what might be expected,
the worsening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union has not meant that Mexico and the socialist camp have
grown further apart. Rather it seems to propitiate a convergence of
the policies of both parties on topics such as maintaining peace and
international security, detente, disarmament, the Mid-East, and
Central America. ' 129 Although these observations are accurate, by
focusing only on recent international tensions, Garza Elizondo over-
looks the contentious record of U.S.-Mexican relations from 1972-
82, and the determined efforts, made by the last three Mexican
administrations, to assert a truly global Mexican foreign policy.
29. Id. at 206-07.
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